*Corrective Justice and Climate Change*

Duties of corrective justice are, roughly, duties to bear the costs that result from one’s wrongful behavior. In previous research, I argued that most reasonably affluent individuals have incurred extensive duties of corrective justice to bear costs associated with climate change in virtue of having wrongfully contributed to climate change-induced harms and threats of future harm. In my current project, I continue to develop the corrective justice approach to the ethics of climate change. Among the questions that I aim to address include the following. First, what explains why an individual’s emissions-producing behavior is even *pro tanto* wrong, given that one's emissions are unlikely to make a difference to the amount of harm that results from climate change? In particular, are an individual’s *attitudes* relevant to the wrongness of her emissions-producing behavior? Second, to what extent is the non-identity problem a problem for the corrective justice approach to the ethics of climate change? Third (and relatedly), have individuals incurred duties of corrective justice to bear costs associated with climate change in virtue of having wrongfully violated impersonal (non-rights-based) constraints? Fourth, what factors are relevant to determining the extent of an individual’s duty of corrective justice (e.g., the extent of one’s emissions, the avoidability of one’s emissions-producing behavior)? Fifth, how ought individuals fulfill their duties of corrective justice to bear the costs associated with climate change, and what is the role of the state in enforcing these duties?