The Mere-Addition Paradox and Origin Essentialism

We affect future generations not just with individual choices but also with sequences of choices.  An underexplored objection to many views and theories in population ethics is that they would, in some cases, recommend sequences of choices that are worse for everyone than some alternative sequence. I will explore sequential choice in population ethics. In combination, I will explore the assumptions about personal identity in population ethics. What determines the identity of future
people and of people in general? Could you have been born much earlier than you did? Could you have had different parents? Is your specific origin essential to you? If your specific origin is essential to you, should you be surprised that you exist, since your existence required history to turn out in an extremely specific way (for example, your parents had to meet, their parents had to meet, and so on)? What, if anything, could explain this fine-tuning of history?