**Climate Ethics and Future Generations**

**Schedule**

**Thursday, April 30th**

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| 9.00 – 9:10 | Brief Introduction |  |
| 9.10 – 10.10 | Anders Herlitz | “Testing the Decomposition Test” Authors: Greg Bognar & Anders HerlitzAbstract: “Contractualism ties moral justification to the idea of "reasonable rejectability" in terms of the complaints one can make against adopting a moral principle.  There is, however, sharp disagreement among contractualists whether contractualism should be based on ex ante or ex post complaints.  Should the complaints that moral agents can raise be based on expected or actual outcomes?  On the one hand, ex post contractualism, which is based on actual outcomes, is vulnerable to well-known objections.  On the other hand, it has been argued that ex ante contractualism, which is based on expected outcomes, is too similar to aggregative views and thereby conflicts with the very motivation to embrace contractualism.A recent proposal to defend ex ante contractualism from this objection introduces the so-called decomposition test, which extends the idea of reasonable rejectability to each stage in which a principle is implemented.  In this paper, we argue that ex ante contractualism with the decomposition test faces a serious problem.  We consider two interpretations of the view, and show that neither can avoid our objection.  We show that the worry about the aggregative nature of ex ante contractualism not only remains, but it is exacerbated with the decomposition test” |
| 10.10 – 10.30 | Coffee Break |  |
| 10.30 – 11.30 | Stephane Zuber | “The welfare implications of climate change-related mortality: Inequality and population ethics”Authors: Stephane Zuber, Marc Fleurbaey, Aurelie Mejean, and Antonin Pottier Climate change-related mortality may strongly affect human well-being. By reducing life expectancy, it  reduces the well-being of some individuals. This may exacerbate existing inequalities: ex-ante inequalityamong people in different groups or regions of the world; ex-post inequality in experienced well-being by peoplein the same generation. But mortality may also reduce total population size by preventing some individuals from having children. This raises the population-ethical problem of how total population size should be valued. We provide estimates of the mortality-related, inequality-related and population-related damages. |
| 11.30 – 13.00 | Lunch |  |
| 13.00 – 14.00 | Krister Bykvist  | “Is sustainability a constraint on permissibility?” Sustainability is a very slippery concept, but I shall take as my starting point the definition of sustainability that was first clearly formulated by the economist Geir Asheim, one of the leading researchers on sustainability in economics: A generation’s management of the resource base at t is sustainable iff it constitutes the first part of a feasible development, starting at t, that sustains x onwards. A development is sustainable iff each generation’s management of the resource base is sustainable. Different accounts of sustainability will provide different choices of x. I shall consider three popular choices: 1. basic needs,2. wellbeing growth or growth rate,3. wellbeing level of the current generation. I shall ask, with respect to each choice of x above, whether sustainability can be seen as a constraint, a *necessary* condition for the moral permissibility of the management of resources, even in cases where the number and identity of future people are at stake. |
| 14.00 – 14.30 | Coffee Break |  |
| 14.30 – 15.00 | Kirsti Jylhä | TBA |
| 15.00 – 15.50 | Extended Coffee Break |  |
| 15.50 – 16.50 | Dean Spears | “Calibrating Population Ethics”Authors: Dean Spears and H. Orri StefánssonIn decision theory, calibration methods investigate whether variable-value orderings can rationalize judgments at different scales.  For example, Rabin (2000) applies calibration tools to undermine the descriptive plausibility of Expected Utility Theory; similarly, Nebel and Stefánsson (m.s.) use calibration methods to assess the plausibility of Prioritarian social welfare functions.  Here, we apply this tool to variable-value population ethics.  The result allows us to considerably weaken the classic Mere Addition axiom, such as to claim only that adding an excellent life in a 2020 developed country, all else equal, is not a worsening.  We show that variable-value axiologies that accept such a small-scale addition must, to be coherent, imply instances of the repugnant conclusion.  These results add to a recent literature that argues that instances of repugnant conclusion are ubiquitous even under theories that are commonly understood to avoid repugnance.  We discuss implications – the narrowest of which is that plausible implementations of variable-value population ethics are likely to quantitatively resemble additively separable social orderings, in some practical cases.In the last few minutes, Dean will also introduce a small but many-authored recent collaboration on the Repugnant Conclusion and invite the participation of anyone interested. |
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